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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The most recent report from the Alliance for Board Diversity shows 
only modest gains in the percentage of Fortune 1002 board seats held by 
females and minorities between 2004 and 2010.3  The percentage of female-
                                                                                                                  
 1  Thomas Lee Hazen is the Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law at UNC School of 
Law.  Lissa Lamkin Broome is the Wachovia Professor of Banking Law, Director of the Center for 
Banking and Finance, and Director of the Director Diversity Initiative at UNC School of Law.  The 
authors thank Eunice Park (UNC School of Law, Class of 2012) for her excellent research assistance. 
 2  All references to Fortune 100 and Fortune 500 companies are based on the 2009 rankings of the 
largest U.S. corporations. See Fortune 500: Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, May 3, 
2010, at F-1. 
 3  Alliance for Board Diversity, Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards 3 
(July 21, 2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/469/abd_2010_census.pdf [hereinafter Missing 
Pieces (Revised)].  The original report issued in May indicated that there had been a decline in the 
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occupied seats increased from 16.9% to 18% (an absolute increase of just 
1.1% over a six-year period) and the percentage of minority-occupied seats 
increased from 14.9% to 15.4% (an absolute increase of 0.5%).4  These 
numbers are especially troubling when we consider that slightly over 50% of 
the population in the United States is female and 33.7% of the population is 
nonwhite, with the nonwhite percentage of the population increasing at a far 
faster rate than the white percentage.5  It is beyond dispute that women and 
minorities are extremely underrepresented on the boards of the country’s 
largest companies.  The picture gets more depressing when we consider that 
the Fortune 100 companies, the largest U.S. companies, have the most 
diversified boards.  While 18% of the Fortune 100 board seats are occupied 
by women, only 15.7% of the Fortune 500 board seats are held by women.6  
The minority percentage of 15.5% on Fortune 100 boards is greater than 
12.9%, the percentage of Fortune 500 board seats held by nonwhites.7  Of 
the fifty largest public companies headquartered in North Carolina, only two 
of which are in the Fortune 100 and only fourteen of which are in the 
Fortune 500, women hold 12.2% of the board seats and minorities occupy 
only 7.1% of the board seats.8 
 Although it is now common for directors to be elected for one-year 
terms, instead of staggered three-year terms, it is still the case that the sitting 
directors are routinely re-nominated to continue their board service year 
after year.  Some companies have mandatory retirement ages, while others 
have term limits for their directors.  A small minority of companies use 
rigorous annual director assessments to avoid re-nominating the least 
effective directors.  Other companies require that a director offer to resign if 
their principal job changes in a material way.  Notwithstanding these 
measures, there is relatively little opportunity for the dynamic of directors to 
shift in any significant way because most sitting directors are re-nominated.  
The Directors Roster Report collected by Jim Kristie of Directors & Boards 
provides one hopeful note.  Kristie reports that in the first quarter of 2011, 
34% of all new directors elected (replacing those who were not continuing 
or filling new board seats) were women, down slightly from the 38% of new 
directors who were women for new board seats filled in the fourth quarter of 
                                                                                                                  
percentage of board seats held by minorities. Alliance for Board Diversity, Missing Pieces: Women and 
Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards 3 (2010), available at http://www.slideshare.net/kacarter/missing-
pieces-womenandminoritiesonfortune500boards. This data was reported in error. Missing Pieces 
(Revised). 
 4  Missing Pieces (Revised), supra note 3, app. 1 at 8. 
 5  Id. at 2. 
 6  Id. at 3, 5. 
 7  Id. 
 8  UNC Sch. of Law Director Diversity Initiative, North Carolina Corporate Board Diversity: 50 
Largest North Carolina Companies, UNC SCH. OF LAW, https://ddi.law.unc.edu/boarddiversity/ 
default.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
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2010.9 
 In Part II, this Article describes some of the different approaches to 
tackling this lack of representation of women and minorities on corporate 
boards.  Part III explores two aspects of proxy statement regulation—
shareholder proposals related to corporate diversity and the recent 
amendments to the proxy regulations, which require that companies disclose 
how they consider diversity in nominating board members.  Part IV presents 
the results of our analysis, which compares proxy statements of Fortune 100 
companies in both the proxy year immediately preceding and immediately 
following the Proxy Disclosure Rule’s effective date.  This analysis catalogs 
the initial effects of the rule regarding how companies discussed diversity in 
nominating board members.  This Article concludes by suggesting that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should issue interpretive 
guidance to clarify its view requiring “consideration” of diversity in the 
director nomination process.  The SEC actually implies that the company 
should implement a diversity “policy” and assess its effectiveness in its 
proxy disclosure statements.  This Article suggests that the SEC should 
clarify this issue through specific guidelines instead of continuing to make 
this point only in the piecemeal proxy comment basis.  Such guidance could 
also suggest including the following: disclosing the assessment of the 
diversity policy’s effectiveness instead of merely discussing “how” the 
policy is assessed, disclosing the demographic diversity of the director-
nominee slate, and describing the concrete steps used to develop a diverse 
slate of director candidates; all of which would be viewed favorably by 
investors. 
II.  APPROACHES TO INCREASING BOARD DIVERSITY 
 The lack of board diversity described above is not confined to 
corporations headquartered in the United States.  The overall percentage of 
board seats held by women in European-based companies is 11.7%, a 
number that is similar to that of the largest companies based in the United 
States.10  Some European countries, however, are reported to have female 
board representation in the single digits.11  Other European countries now 
boast female board percentages of 40% (Norway), 28.2% (Sweden), and 
26% (Finland).12  In part, these differences represent the effects of dramatic 
efforts taken in some countries to address the lack of gender diversity on 
                                                                                                                  
 9  Jim Kristie, The Rostering of New Directors, DIRS. & BDS. (May 2011), available at 
http://www.directorsandboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/DBeletterMAY11.html (for 2010, 34% of new 
board appointees were women, up from 25% in 2008). 
 10  Douglas M. Branson, Women on Boards of Directors: A Global Snapshot 1 (Univ. of Pittsburg 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2011-05, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762615. 
 11  Id.  The five worst European countries in terms of female board representation are Portugal 
(0.6%), Italy (3.6%), Luxembourg (6%), Germany (7%), and Switzerland (approximately 7%). Id. 
 12  Id. 
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boards.13  This part of the Article will describe some of these different 
approaches. 
 Those countries that mandate board gender diversity quotas 
illustrate the boldest approach to affecting board diversity.  Norway was the 
first country to enact a quota law in 2005, which required listed companies 
to achieve at least 40% female board representation by 2008, or face 
delisting.14  Spain recently followed suit, with a 40% quota to be achieved 
by 2016.15  In the case of Spain, however, the quota is more aspirational 
than mandatory because there are no significant penalties for 
noncompliance.16  In late 2010, France adopted a 40% quota to be phased in 
with 20% female representation required by 2014 and 40% by 2017.17  
Other countries, including Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, have 
actively discussed imposing a quota requirement.18 
 A second approach is for governments to suggest diversity targets or 
for companies themselves to voluntarily commit to diversifying their boards 
to achieve certain desired percentages of female representation.  For 
instance, a report by the British government suggested that British 
companies strive to achieve 25% female board representation by 2015.19  In 
November 2010, some boards’ chairs of the United Kingdom’s largest 
companies founded a “30% Club” to achieve 30% female board 
representation by 2016.20  Dutch companies that voluntarily sign a “Talent 
to the Top” pledge have also agreed to add women to their boards.21 
 A third approach to increasing board diversity involves monitoring 
board diversity, educating about its benefits, and identifying and placing 
qualified diverse candidates in board seats.  Organizations in the United 
States, such as Catalyst, Inc., the Executive Leadership Council, and the 
Hispanic Association of Corporate Responsibility, among many others, have 
worked tirelessly on these fronts; but, in recent years at least, these efforts 
have not significantly changed the board diversity dynamic.22  An 
interesting example of such an approach has been spearheaded by the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors.23  Potential female directors 
attend a board education program and join up with a mentor who is a 
                                                                                                                  
 13  The board diversity conversation in other countries has focused almost exclusively on gender 
diversity rather than on racial or ethnic diversity. See, e.g., id. at 4. 
 14  Id. at 6. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. at 7. 
 18  Id. at 6. 
 19  Zoe Wood & Tom Bawden, Inquiry Calls for More Women in Boardroom, GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/24/davies-inquiry-women-boardroom-targets-quotas. 
 20  See generally 30% CLUB, http://www.30percentclub.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
 21  Branson, supra note 10, at 10. 
 22  See, e.g., id. at 12. 
 23  Id. 
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corporate board chair who pledges to mentor the potential female director 
for one year and to help place her on a corporate board by the end of that 
one-year relationship.24  The early returns from that effort are promising.25 
 The fourth approach to increasing board diversity is explored in 
greater depth in this Article.  This approach mandates disclosure of each 
company’s policy on board diversity.  In the United States, the SEC recently 
adopted a new proxy disclosure rule, which is discussed in more detail 
below.26  Another example of a disclosure approach is in Australia where 
public corporations are subject to newly revised corporate governance 
principles and recommendations to: (a) explain their policy on gender 
diversity; (b) disclose measurable objectives for board gender diversity; and 
(c) assess the company’s progress towards meeting those objectives.27  In 
addition, the United Kingdom Financial Reporting Council is considering 
requiring a description of each board’s policy on gender diversity, including 
any measurable objectives that have been set and progress made toward 
achieving those objectives.28 
 The disclosure guideline in Australia goes several steps further than 
the SEC’s amended rule by:  requiring a diversity policy, which must be 
explained in the proxy; requiring disclosure of measurable objectives for 
board gender diversity; and requiring an assessment of the company’s 
progress toward meeting those objectives.29  The Australian approach seems 
similar to a voluntary quota, with each company being able to determine the 
“measurable objective” to which it will be held.30  Notwithstanding the 
stronger language of the Australian approach, it is only a guideline—
companies may either comply with it or explain why they do not believe the 
                                                                                                                  
 24  Id. at 12–13.  Most Australian board chairs are not the corporation’s CEO and therefore may have 
more time to engage in this mentoring effort. See id. at 14.  In the United States, on the other hand, 84% 
of Fortune 1000 CEOs also occupy the corporate board chair seat. Id. 
 25  Id. at 13. 
 26  See infra Part III.B.3. 
 27  AUSTL. SEC. EXCH., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH 2010 
AMENDMENTS 3.2, at 24–25 (2d ed. 2010), available at http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/ 
cg_principles_recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCPLES].  These recommendations are not prescriptive, but are instead guidelines. Id. at 5.  If a 
company believes that a recommendation is not appropriate for it, then it need not adopt it but must 
explain why—the “if not, why not” approach. Id. 
 28  FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, CONSULTATION DOCUMENT:  GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS 
5 (May 2011), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/publications/pub2575.html.  The U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code, Supporting Principle B.2, which came into effect in June 2010, includes the 
statement:  “the search for board candidates should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, 
against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including 
gender.” Id. at 1.  Lord Davies of Abersoch was then commissioned by the government to review board 
gender diversity. LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, WOMEN ON BOARDS 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/w/11-745-women-on-boards.pdf.  His February 
2011 report recommended that the U.K. Corporate Governance Code be further amended “to require 
listed companies to establish a policy concerning boardroom diversity, including measurable objectives 
for implementing the policy, and disclose annually a summary of the policy and the progress made in 
achieving the objectives.” Id. 
 29  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 22–25. 
 30  See id. 
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policy applies to them.31  It will be interesting to see whether the Australian 
companies elect not to comply or, if they do comply, whether they select a 
measurable objective that approaches the 40% quota adopted in Norway and 
other countries, or whether they will begin at much lower levels as they 
work to increase the gender diversity of their board candidates.32  In any 
event, this discussion should be instructive to the United Kingdom’s 
Financial Reporting Council, as it considers whether and how to require 
disclosure of a diversity policy, any objectives for implementing that policy, 
and any progress in achieving those objectives. 
 With this background on alternative approaches, we next explore in 
detail how the U.S. proxy regulation affects board diversity. 
III.  PROXY REGULATION GENERALLY 
 The federal securities laws are aimed at full disclosure and investor 
protection.33  Although the securities laws can have an impact on shaping 
corporate governance, that is not their primary focus; corporate governance 
matters are generally left to state law and, in particular, the law of the state 
in which a business is incorporated.34  Notwithstanding this dichotomy 
between the federal securities laws and state corporate laws, there have been 
many instances in which the securities laws have had an impact on corporate 
governance and on issues relating to social responsibility.  This article 
explores the intersection between the federal securities laws and other 
attempts to monitor diversity in the composition of corporate boards of 
directors.35 
 As developed more fully below, the first action in this area arose 
with respect to shareholder proposals to the board to increase board 
diversity.36  Over a number of years, these proposals were made and were 
often included in management’s proxy solicitation materials.  Although 
these efforts did not appear to have any significant impact on the expansion 
of diversity, they established board diversity as a matter of concern for many 
shareholders.  This, in turn, set the background for the SEC’s adoption of 
disclosure requirements.  Until 2010, there were no laws or regulations 
directly addressing diversity on corporate boards, but as discussed below, 
                                                                                                                  
 31  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 32  See supra Part II. 
 33  See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A] (6th 
ed., 2009) [hereinafter HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION] (discussing the history and scope of the federal 
securities laws). 
 34  See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder 
Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 391, 426–28 
(discussing the distinction between investor protection laws and state corporate laws). 
 35  For discussion of increasing concern over the lack of diversity on U.S. corporate boards, see the 
articles included in Symposium, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in the Gaps, 89 
N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011). 
 36  See infra Part III. 
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new SEC rules require disclosure of board diversity policies.37 
 Procedures and rules regarding election of corporate directors are 
governed by state corporate laws.  State corporate laws provide that 
corporate directors are elected by the shareholders.38  When publicly held 
corporations solicit shareholder votes or consent, the proxy solicitation 
materials are subject to the disclosure provisions set forth in the SEC rules 
and forms promulgated under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.39  
Neither state law nor federal law set forth requirements for director diversity 
or other board qualifications.40 
A.  Shareholder Proposals for Increased Board Diversity 
 Diversity on corporate boards first emerged as an issue under the 
federal securities laws in the context of the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule.  
SEC Rule 14a-8, which is better known as the shareholder proposal rule, 
determines instances in which management must include shareholder-
generated proposals in management’s proxy solicitation materials.41  Over 
the years, the shareholder proposal rule has proven a powerful tool for 
shareholders desiring to voice concerns relating to social issues.  Even 
though shareholder proposals generally do not meet with much success 
when tallying votes, they have had a huge impact on raising corporate social 
consciousness.42 
 Corporate managements’ reluctance to rapidly diversify the makeup 
of corporate boards was mirrored in their attempts to block shareholder 
proposals questioning the lack of diversity.  Under the shareholder proposal 
rule, once a shareholder makes a timely submission of a proposal for 
consideration at an upcoming shareholder meeting, management must 
include the proposal in management’s proxy solicitation materials unless 
management can invoke one of the thirteen grounds listed in the rule for 
                                                                                                                  
 37  Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9089, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-61175, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29092, 2009 WL 4857389, *18 (Dec. 16, 2009).  In 
2010, the SEC implemented amendments to its disclosure regulations to require a publicly held company 
to disclose its policy, if any, on the role of diversity in board selection. Id. (SEC release adopted the 
board diversity policy disclosure requirement).  The SEC disclosure requirement is discussed infra Part 
III.B. 
 38  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2006) (“Unless directors are elected by written 
consent in lieu of an annual meeting as permitted by this subsection, an annual meeting of stockholders 
shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the manner provided 
in the bylaws.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (“Directors are elected at the first annual 
shareholders’ meeting and at each annual meeting thereafter unless their terms are staggered . . . .”). 
 39  15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006); see also, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2011). 
 40  See generally Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A 
Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011) (discussing various points of view as 
to whether board diversity should be encouraged or required). 
 41  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 42  See 3 HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 33, § 10.8[8] (discussing shareholder 
proposals and social responsibility). 
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excluding such a proposal.43  One ground for excluding a proposal is that it 
relates to the election of a director.44  This basis for excluding shareholder 
proposals applies solely to those proposals that would impact a particular 
office holder.  It does not justify exclusion of proposals relating to policies 
or procedures concerning director qualifications and elections generally.45 
 Starting nearly twenty years ago, the shareholder proposal rule 
brought concerns about director diversity into the public arena.  Based on a 
review of no action letter requests involving shareholder proposals, interest 
in diversity on corporate boards surfaced in the 1990s.46  In many instances, 
the SEC staff opined that properly drafted proposals regarding board 
diversity could not be excluded from management’s proxy statement.47  It is 
not surprising, however, that corporate management frequently tried to 
convince the SEC that these proposals should be excluded.  For example, 
management attempted to exclude proposals under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(1),48 
which allows exclusion of proposals involving subject matters not 
appropriate for shareholder action as determined by state law in the 
jurisdiction of incorporation.49  The essence of management’s argument was 
that diversity proposals require the board of directors to take certain actions, 
which violate state laws protecting the discretionary authority of board 
                                                                                                                  
 43  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (also requiring qualifications for a shareholder to submit a 
proposal). 
 44  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (amended 2010) (permitting management to exclude a proposal 
relating to director elections). 
 45  Id.; see also 3 HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 33, § 10.8[9] (discussing the 
shareholder proposal rule as it relates to the election of directors). 
 46  See, e.g., Office Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 306, at *5 (Mar. 
7, 1994); PepsiCo, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 218, at *1 (Feb. 15, 1994); 
Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *1 (Mar. 25, 1993). 
 47  A review of fourteen properly submitted shareholder proposals requesting general plans to 
increase board diversity through greater consideration of women and minority candidates revealed that 
the SEC found all such proposals to be non-excludable and issued No-Action responses to that effect.    
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 943024, at *1 (Mar. 3, 2003); Exxon 
Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 65676, at *1 (Jan. 22, 2001); Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 364070, at *1 (Mar. 22, 2000); Am. Power Conversion Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2000 WL 343456, at *1 (Mar. 10, 2000); Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
1999 WL 212715, at *1  (Apr. 12, 1999); Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 
68604, at *1 (Feb. 12, 1999); Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *1 
(Apr. 3, 1998); Cypress Semiconductor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 113674, at *1 (Mar. 11, 
1998); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 56567, at *1 (Feb. 2, 1998); E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40238, at *1 (Jan. 27, 1998); Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 426409, at *1 (July 29, 1996); Office Depot, Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 306, at *1 (Mar. 7, 1994); PepsiCo, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 218, at *1 (Feb. 15, 1994); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 
WL 93602, at *1 (Mar. 25, 1993). 
 48  See The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851099, at *8 (Mar. 22, 
2006); Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *1 (Feb. 12, 1999); see 
also Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *3 (Apr. 3, 1998); Dayton 
Hudson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 94825, at *2 (Mar. 5, 1996); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1998 WL 56567, at *4 (Feb. 2, 1998); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 
93602, at *6 (Mar. 25, 1993). 
 49  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1). 
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members to act in accord with their best judgment.50  The typical response 
by proponents of these shareholder proposals was that the proposals do not 
mandate action, but rather recommend that certain criteria be considered in 
the board’s exercise of best judgment.51  In addition, there were examples of 
management seeking to exclude the shareholder proposals from 
management’s proxy statement because of SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(2), which 
permits exclusion of proposals that would force the company to violate state 
or federal law.52  The arguments here were similar to those made under 
subsection (1) of the SEC rule53 and the shareholder response was generally 
the same.54  Another argument put forth for exclusion under subsection (2), 
which was also rejected by the SEC, was that the proposals, if implemented, 
would force the company to violate federal law under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.55 
 Management also attempted to exclude proposals relating to board 
diversity under Rule 14a-8(i)(3),56 which states that a proposal may be 
omitted if it is contrary to any of the Commission’s proxy rules and 
regulations including Rule 14a-9, which proscribes inclusion of false or 
misleading information as to a material fact.57  The two most prevalent 
arguments under this subsection are either that the proposal is misleading 
because it is too vague to be implemented, or that the proposal actually 
contains false or misleading statements.58  The common shareholder 
                                                                                                                  
 50  See The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851099, at *8 (Mar. 22, 
2006); Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *1 (Feb. 12, 1999); see 
also Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *3 (Apr. 3, 1998); Texaco, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 56567, at *4 (Feb. 2, 1998) (company erroneously refers to Rule 
14a-8(c)(1) as Rule 14a-8(c)(11)); Dayton Hudson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 94825, at *2 
(Mar. 5, 1996); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *6 (Mar. 25, 1993) (company 
erroneously refers to Rule 14a-8(c)(1) as Rule 14a-8(c)(11)). 
 51  See, e.g., Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *6 (Feb. 12, 
1999). 
 52  See The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851099, at *8 (Mar. 22, 
2006); EMC Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 571685, at *7 (Mar. 14, 2002); see also Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *2–3 (Apr. 3, 1998); E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40238, at *2 (Jan. 27, 1998); Mylan Labs., Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 150687, at *3 (Apr. 6, 1995). 
 53  See The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851099, at *8 (Mar. 22, 
2006); Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *3 (Apr. 3, 1998). 
 54  See, e.g., The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851099, at *35 (Mar. 
22, 2006). 
 55  See EMC Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 571685, at *7 (Mar. 14, 2002); Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *4 (Apr. 3, 1998); Mylan Labs., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1995 WL 150687, at *3 (Apr. 6, 1995). 
 56  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2011). 
 57  See id.§ 240.14a-9. 
 58  See, e.g., The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851099, at *9 (Mar. 22, 
2006) (arguing that the proposal is misleading because it is too vague and indefinite); E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 943024, at *2 (Mar. 3, 2003) (arguing that the 
proposal is misleading because the proponent has demonstrated that he does not support his own 
proposal); Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 597371, at *5 (Mar. 19, 2002) (arguing 
that the proposal contains a number of false and unsupported statements); EMC Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2002 WL 571685, at *3 (Mar. 14, 2002) (arguing that the proposal is misleading because it is too 
vague and indefinite and that the proposal contains a number of false and misleading statements); Exxon 
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response to the vagueness argument, which is supported by precedent, was 
that there is nothing inherently vague about the proposals.59  While the SEC 
has found that some proposals contained false or misleading statements, the 
Commission has generally opted not to exclude the entire proposal, but 
rather only exclude the individual false or misleading statements.60  
Alternatively, the SEC has said it would not approve the request to exclude 
a proposal in its entirety, provided the proponent corrected or deleted the 
offending statements.61  Relatively few companies have sought omission 
under Rule 14a-8(i)(6),62 which permits exclusion of proposals that are 
beyond the company’s power to effectuate.63  Several attempts to exclude 
proposals have been made under subsection (i)(7),64 which allows exclusion 
of proposals that relate to the ordinary business matters of the company.65  
SEC staff responses rejected this argument because director nominations fall 
under the umbrella of corporate governance, which is not considered a 
matter of ordinary business.66  A number of companies made unsuccessful 
attempts to exclude proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(8),67 which permits 
                                                                                                                  
Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 364070 , at *4 (Mar. 22, 2000) (arguing that the proposal 
is false and misleading because it misstates the current number of female and minority board members); 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 212715, at *3 (Apr. 12, 1999) (arguing that 
the proposal is misleading because the proponent has demonstrated that he does not support his own 
proposal); Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *3 (Feb. 12, 1999) 
(arguing that the proposal is misleading because it is too vague and indefinite); E. I. du Pont de Nemours 
and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40238 (Jan. 27, 1998) (no explanation of argument given); 
PepsiCo, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 218, at *4 (Feb. 15, 1994) (arguing that 
the proposal is misleading because it is too vague and indefinite and that the proposal contains a number 
of false and misleading statements); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *2 (Mar. 
25, 1993) (arguing that the proposal is misleading because it is too vague and indefinite and that the 
proposal contains a number of false and misleading statements). 
 59  See The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851099, at *33 (Mar. 22, 
2006); Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *6 (Feb. 12, 1999); 
Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *10 (Mar. 25, 1993). 
 60  See, e.g., EMC Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 571685, at *1 (Mar. 14, 2002). 
 61  Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *1 (Mar. 25, 1993). 
 62  See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *4 (Apr. 3, 1998) 
(arguing inability to implement the proposal because the shareholders and not the company ultimately 
elect the board members). 
 63  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(6) (2011). 
 64  See Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 364070, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2000) (arguing 
that nomination of directors falls within ordinary business matters); Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1998 WL 172789, at *2 (Apr. 3, 1998) (arguing that nomination of directors falls within 
ordinary business matters); Cypress Semiconductor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 113674, at 
*6 (Mar. 11, 1998) (arguing that the proposal implicates its ethical standards, a matter of ordinary 
business, and issuance of reports to stockholders, which is also a matter of ordinary business). 
 65  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
 66  See Cypress Semiconductor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 113674, at *8 (Mar. 11, 
1998). 
 67  See Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *3–4 (Feb. 12, 1999) 
(arguing that the proposal results in an election contest that seeks to remove current board members and 
replace them with members of a specified group); Cypress Semiconductor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 
1998 WL 113674, at *5 (Mar. 11, 1998) (arguing that the proposal results in an election contest that 
seeks to remove current board members and replace them with members of a specified group); Texaco, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 56567, at *3 (Feb. 2, 1998) (arguing that proposal is an improper 
attempt to criticize current board members and influence director elections); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *5 (Mar. 25, 1993) (arguing that proposal is an improper attempt to 
criticize current board members and influence director elections). 
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exclusion of proposals relating to an actual election of officers.68  The SEC 
did not permit exclusion because the proposals were focused on the 
characteristics of director-nominees and not on specific board elections.69 
 As the foregoing overview demonstrates, the SEC staff was 
generally receptive to properly drafted shareholder proposals regarding 
director diversity, provided that the proposals were submitted in a timely 
manner.  Notwithstanding managements’ attempts to exclude board 
diversity proposals on various grounds, the SEC staff responses tended to 
deny the applicability of any substantive ground for exclusion.70  After a 
number of proposals regarding board diversity in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
there appeared to be a decrease in shareholder proposals on this issue, in 
part because there were modest gains in diversity representation on 
corporate boards during this period.  In addition, each year there is a new 
area of focus for shareholder proposals and issues relating to the corporate 
governance failures, such as Enron, that shift the focus of many activist 
shareholders to other types of governance reforms.71  In more recent years, 
risk management and credit or derivatives exposure has become a primary 
focus of many shareholder proposals.72 
 
                                                                                                                  
 68  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
 69  See Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *5 (Feb. 12, 1999); 
Cypress Semiconductor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 113674, at *7 (Mar. 11, 1998); Texaco, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 56567, at *11 (Feb. 2, 1998); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
1993 WL 93602, at *8 (Mar. 25, 1993). 
 70  See E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 943024, at *1 (Mar. 3, 
2003); Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 65676, at *1 (Jan. 22, 2001); Exxon Mobil 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 364070, at *1 (Mar. 22, 2000); Am. Power Conversion Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 343456, at *1 (Mar. 10, 2000); Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1999 WL 212715, at *1 (Apr. 12, 1999); Assocs. First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1999 WL 68604, at *1 (Feb. 12, 1999); Circuit City Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 
172789, at *1 (Apr. 3, 1998); Cypress Semiconductor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 113674, at 
*1 (Mar. 11, 1998); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 56567, at *1 (Feb. 2, 1998); E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40238, at *1 (Jan. 27, 1998); Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 426409, at *1 (July 29, 1996); Office Depot, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 306, at *1 (Mar. 7, 1994); PepsiCo, Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 218, at *1 (Feb. 15, 1994); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *1 (Mar. 25, 1993). 
  Management had more success in excluding shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(11), which 
allows the omission of proposals that are identical to another proposal already planned to be included in 
the proxy statement. See EMC Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 571685, at *1 (Mar. 14, 2002); 
Nucor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 198, at *1 (Feb. 16, 1999); Mylan Labs., 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 150687, at *1 (Apr. 6, 1995). 
 71  See 3 HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 33, § 10.8[1] at d. (July 2011 pocket pt.) 
(discussing various proposals over time). 
 72  Id. 
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B.  SEC’s Board Nomination Diversity Policy Disclosure Requirement 
1.  SEC’s Request for Comments 
 The post-Enron and 2008 financial crises led the SEC to consider 
many corporate governance reforms.73  Among those reforms were 
increased disclosures relating to director elections. 
 On July 10, 2009, the SEC proposed a number of amendments to 
the proxy disclosure rule.74  In particular, the SEC proposals targeted 
providing shareholders with information regarding the relationship between 
a company’s compensation policies and risk, director and nominee 
qualifications, company leadership structure, and the potential conflicts of 
interests of compensation consultants.75  The SEC cited the increased desire 
among shareholders of publicly held companies to make informed voting 
and investment decisions as a motive behind these proposed amendments.76 
 As part of its rule proposals, the SEC asked for comments 
addressing whether director diversity is a significant issue in light of the 
proposed goals of providing more meaningful information to the investors 
through the proxy statements.77  The SEC explained that board diversity 
disclosure should be imposed:  (a) to aid shareholders in their judgment of 
the relative fit of a director or nominee to a particular company; and (b) to 
allow more flexibility to companies in disclosing material information about 
the qualifications of a director or nominee.78 
                                                                                                                  
 73  For example, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there are audit committee independence 
requirements and the committee should include at least one financial expert.  The Act requires a public 
company’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer to certify that, to the best of their 
knowledge, the financial statements are accurately presented. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, §§ 302, 906 (2003). 
 74  See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076 (proposed July 17, 
2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229). 
 75  See id. at 35,086. 
 76  Id. at 35,076 (“We have decided to re-examine our disclosure rules to provide investors with 
important and relevant information upon which to base their proxy voting and investment decisions.”). 
 77  See id. at 35,076–77 (explaining that the proposed amendments “are designed to enhance the 
information included in proxy and information statements . . . [the SEC] believe[s] that some of [its] 
current disclosure requirements on these topics could be improved to elicit more informative disclosure 
for investors.”). 
 78  See id. at 35,083.  
The proposed amendments are designed to provide investors with more 
meaningful disclosure to help them in their voting decisions by better enabling 
them to determine whether and why a director or nominee is a good fit for a 
particular company, and to allow companies flexibility in disclosing material 
information on the background and specific qualifications of each director and 
nominee, including information that goes beyond the five-year biographical 
requirement of Item 401. 
Id. 
  We submitted a comment letter urging the SEC to consider requiring disclosure of the board’s 
make-up in terms of race, gender, and ethnicity. See Letter from Lissa Lamkin Broome & Thomas Lee 
Hazen, Professors of Law, Univ. of N.C., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-65.pdf (urging such a disclosure 
requirement).  However, as discussed below, the SEC requirements do not go this far. 
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2.  Comments Addressing Board Diversity Disclosure 
 Various individuals and organizations responded with comments 
regarding enhanced disclosure of director and nominee qualifications and 
mentioned that a board’s diversity policy was important information for 
investors.79  A number of the comments that discussed diversity disclosure 
also considered board diversity as an important factor influencing the voting 
decisions of investors.80  There were over 130 comment letters submitted to 
the SEC in response to this amendment.81  Most of the letters were 
submitted by groups with a specific interest in diversity or by institutional 
investors, including mutual funds, pension funds, and socially responsible 
investment funds.82  Fifty-six of the comment letters specifically commented 
on the diversity disclosure aspects of the proposed rule.83  The proposed rule 
                                                                                                                  
 79  See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,342 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229). 
 80  Id. at 68,355 (“Board diversity policy is an important factor in the voting decisions of some 
investors.”). 
 81  Id. 
 82  See Comments on Proposed Rule: Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, U.S. SEC. 
AND EXCH. COMM’N, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309.shtml (last visited Jan. 
3, 2012). 
 83  See id.; Comment Letter from Gary Brouse to Mary Schapiro, Chairperson, SEC (Nov. 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-159.pdf; Comment Letter from Jeffrey W. 
Rubin, Chair of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, American Bar Association, to U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
09/s71309-152.pdf; Comment Letter from Dr. Andrea C. Hall, Governance Committee Chair, American 
Century Investments, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Oct. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-151.pdf; Comment Letter from Paul M. Neuhauser, on 
behalf of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC 
(Sept. 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-139.pdf; Comment Letter 
from Anne Simpson, Senior Portfolio Manager, Global Equity, California Public Employees' Retirement 
System, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-146.pdf; Comment Letter from Ashbel C. Williams, Executive Director and 
CIO, State Board of Administration of Florida, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-132.pdf; Comment Letter from William M. 
Tartikoff, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Calvert Group, Ltd. and Ivy Wafford Duke, 
Assistant Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, Calvert Group, Ltd., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-130.pdf; 
Comment Letter from Carl Brooks, President and CEO, The Executive Leadership Council, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
09/s71309-142.pdf; Comment Letter from Wendy Beecham, CEO, Forum for Women Entrepreneurs & 
Executives, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-122.pdf; Comment Letter from Mary Kay Craig, Sisters 
of Charity, BVM, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-119.pdf; Comment Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & 
Hamilton LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-118.pdf; Comment Letter from Ernst & Young LLP to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-110.pdf; Comment Letter from Eleanor Bloxham, CEO, The Value Alliance and Corporate 
Governance Alliance, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-107.pdf; Comment Letter from Denise L. Nappier, State 
Treasurer, Connecticut State Treasurer, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-104.pdf; Comment Letter from Gerald W. 
McEntee, International President, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-103.pdf; Comment Letter from Ilene H. Lang, President and CEO, Catalyst, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
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09/s71309-100.pdf; Comment Letter from Sara Watkins, DC Friend of Board Room Bound, to U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-95.pdf; Comment Letter from Ruth Strauss, Strauss Consulting, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-92.pdf; 
Comment Letter from Glyn A. Holton, Executive Director, United States Proxy Exchange, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
09/s71309-83.pdf; Comment Letter from John B. Keane, American Electric Power Company, Inc., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-81.pdf; Comment Letter from Ryan J. Maley, Software Technologies Group, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
09/s71309-80.pdf; Comment Letter from David H. Zellner, Chief Investment Officer, General Board of 
Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC 
(Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-79.pdf; Comment Letter 
from Cheryl Smith, President, Trillium Asset Management Corporation, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-72.pdf; 
Comment Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Eaton 
Corporation,  Chair of Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-69.pdf; 
Comment Letter from Lissa Lamkin Broome, Wachovia Professor of Banking Law, Director, Center for 
Banking and Finance Director, Director Diversity Initiative University of North Carolina School of Law 
and Thomas Lee Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, Working Group Member, 
Director Diversity Initiative, Board of Advisors, Center for Banking and Finance, University of North 
Carolina School of Law, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-65.pdf; Comment Letter from Rev. Seamus P. Finn, 
Director of the Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation Office, Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate, 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-145.pdf; Comment Letter from Nancy Sims, President, The Robert Toigo Foundation, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-140.pdf; Comment Letter from Christopher Ailman, Chief Investment Officer, California 
State Teachers' Retirement System, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-84.pdf; Comment Letter from Patrick M. Prout, 
President and CEO, The Prout Group, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-74.pdf; Comment Letter from Timothy 
Smith, Senior Vice President, Walden Asset Management, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC 
(Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-71.pdf; Comment Letter 
from Miriam Burgess, President, Board of Directors Network, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 
SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-67.pdf; Comment 
Letter from Chloe Drew, Executive Director, The Council of Urban Professionals, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-
62.pdf; Comment Letter from Dawn K. Wolfe, Associate Director of ESG Research, Boston Common 
Asset Management; John Horning, Executive Director, WildEarth Guardians; Carole Lombard csj, 
Director of Justice and Peace, Sisters of St. Joseph; Steve Mason, Director, Brethren Foundation, Church 
of the Brethren Benefit Trust; Pleroma Foundation; Susan Vickers, RSM, VP Community Health, 
Catholic Healthcare West; and Stephen Viederman, Christopher Reynolds Foundation, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-
59.pdf; Comment Letter from Linda K. Bolliger, Founder and Board Chair, Boardroom Bound, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-57.pdf; Comment Letter from Lisa N. Woll, CEO, Social Investment Forum, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
09/s71309-55.pdf; Comment Letter from Ellen Toplin, President, The Forum of Executive Women, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
13-09/s71309-53.pdf; Comment Letter from Jorge C. Corralejo, Chairman and CEO, Latino Business 
Chamber of Greater Los Angeles, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Sept. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-143.pdf; Comment Letter from Julie F. Gorte, Ph.D., 
Pax World Management Corp., and Tracey C. Rembert, Sustainability Analyst and Governance 
Advocate, Pax World Management Corp., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 12, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-45.pdf; Comment Letter from Kathryn J. 
Hayley, Chief Executive Officer, Aon Consulting (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-42.htm; Comment Letter from Kathleen C. Stone, President, The Boston 
Club, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-138.pdf; Comment Letter from Carol Bowie, Head of the Governance 
Institute, RiskMetrics Group, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 10, 2009), available at 
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did not define diversity, but twenty-seven of the commenters mentioned 
gender diversity, eighteen commented on racial diversity, and thirteen 
mentioned ethnic diversity.84  Two commenters mentioned diversity of 
background and skills.85  Five of the fifty-six comment letters relating to the 
diversity disclosure did not favor such disclosure.86 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-39.pdf; Comment Letter from Carla Rutley, Executive 
Director, Milwaukee Women Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-66.pdf; Comment Letter from Rona Wells, President, 
InterOrganization Network, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-43.pdf; Comment Letter from Justin Levis, Senior 
Research Associate, Council of Institutional Investors, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 8, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-33.pdf; Comment Letter from Hye-
Won Choi, Senior Vice President and Head of Corporate Governance, TIAA-CREF, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-
32.pdf; Comment Letter from Roger Clegg, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal 
Opportunity, to Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-26.htm; Comment Letter from Diana Oleskevich, Sisters of St. Joseph of 
Carondelet, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-49.pdf; Comment Letter from John C. Guerra, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, 
New America Alliance, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-31.pdf; Comment Letter from Diana Oleskevich, Sisters 
of St. Joseph of Carondelet (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ comments/s7-13-
09/s71309-24.htm; Comment Letter from Carlos F. Orta, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Aug. 31, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-23.pdf; Comment Letter from 
Valerie Heinonen, o.s.u.,  Consultant, Corporate Social Responsibility, on behalf of the Ursuline Sisters 
of Tildonk, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-18.pdf; Comment Letter from Valerie Heinonen, o.s.u., Consultant, 
Corporate Social Responsibility, on behalf of the Dominican Sisters of Hope, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (Aug. 25, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-20.pdf; 
Comment Letter from Valerie Heinonen, o.s.u., Consultant, Corporate Social Responsibility, on behalf of 
Mercy Investment Program, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-19.pdf; Comment Letter from Valerie Heinonen, o.s.u., 
Consultant, Corporate Social Responsibility, on behalf of the Sisters of Mercy Regional Community of 
Detroit Charitable Trust, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-17.pdf; Comment Letter from Sumner M. Grant, 
Executive Director, The Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board, (Aug. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-16.pdf; Comment Letter from Catherine Rowan (Aug. 
22, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-14.htm. 
 84  See supra note 83.  In a 2010 speech, SEC Commissioner Aguilar noted that the comment “letters 
were overwhelmingly supportive, with approximately 90% expressing support for disclosure of 
information related to race and gender diversity on the board.”  Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n, Diversity in the Boardroom is Important and, Unfortunately, Still Rare, at 2 (Sept. 16, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch091610laa.htm (given at the SAIS Center 
for Transatlantic Relations Conference on Closing the Gender Gap: Global Perspectives on Women in 
the Boardroom). 
 85  Comment Letter from Dr. Andrea C. Hall, Governance Committee Chair, American Century 
Investments, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-151.pdf (“diversity of background, skills, race and gender brings broader 
perspective to our deliberations as a board”); Comment Letter from Chloe Drew, Executive Director, 
Council of Urban Professionals, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-62.pdf (“diversity of backgrounds and skills”). 
 86  Comment Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair of the Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities, American Bar Association, to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-152.pdf; Comment Letter from Cleary 
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-118.pdf; Comment Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Eaton Corporation, Chair of Corporate Leadership Initiative, 
Business Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
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 The commenters urging adoption of the disclosure requirement 
mentioned various reasons for their support: that shareholders generally 
value diversity; that diverse boards may perform better than non-diverse 
boards; that diverse boards reduce workplace discrimination and improve 
employee recruiting, retention, and productivity; and that diverse boards will 
better reflect the diversity of employees, customers, and other corporate 
stakeholders.87 
 In the five comments that opposed diversity disclosure, three stated 
that diversity was an important value.88  However, two of those three 
thought additional disclosure about diversity would not be helpful, and the 
other commenter stated that mentioning diversity as a factor in board 
nomination would degrade female and minority candidates if this quality 
was misunderstood as being the nominee’s “qualification” to be a director.89  
A fourth commenter stated that proxies currently discuss diversity if that is a 
factor considered in nominating directors, and therefore no further 
disclosure related to diversity is necessary.90  A final commenter was 
strongly opposed to any consideration of race or ethnicity in selecting board 
members.91 
 TIAA-CREF, a large institutional shareholder, submitted a comment 
letter that urged the SEC to leave “diversity” undefined.   
We do not believe, however, that diversity should be 
defined in the same way for all companies.  Diversity of 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-69.pdf; Comment Letter from Roger Clegg, President 
and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, to Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 1, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-26.htm; Comment Letter from John 
C. Guerra, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, New America Alliance, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC 
(Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-31.pdf. 
 87  See supra note 83. 
 88  Comment Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 
SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-118.pdf; Comment 
Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Eaton Corporation,  Chair of 
Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 
15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-69.pdf; Comment Letter from 
John C. Guerra, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, New America Alliance, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 
SEC (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-31.pdf. 
 89  Comment Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 
SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-118.pdf; Comment 
Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Eaton Corporation, Chair of 
Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 
15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-69.pdf (additional diversity 
disclosure would not be helpful); Comment Letter from John C. Guerra, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, 
New America Alliance, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-31.pdf (mentioning diversity as a factor would degrade 
female and minority candidates). 
 90  Comment Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair of the Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities, American Bar Association, to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-152.pdf. 
 91  Comment Letter from Roger Clegg, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal 
Opportunity, to Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-26.htm. 
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perspectives can be achieved through consideration of a 
number of different criteria, including gender, ethnicity, 
geographical origin, educational background, professional 
experience or any number of other factors.  Each company 
should take into account factors based on its own business 
model and specific needs and disclose the rationale for the 
criteria used.92 
 In adopting its final rule, the Commission acknowledged that 
disclosure of “how the board considers and addresses diversity, as well as 
the board’s assessment of the implementation of its diversity policy, if any,” 
would be useful to investors in evaluating the leadership of the companies.93  
Furthermore, the Commission observed that a large number of commenters 
considered board diversity a significant means to: (a) provide relevant 
information to shareholders about corporate culture and governance 
practices, allowing them to make informed voting and investment decisions; 
and (b) measure the financial performance and recruiting ability of the 
companies.94  In the light of the positive response regarding board diversity 
disclosure, the Commission adopted amendments requiring disclosure in 
proxy statements of any company policy relating to board diversity.95 
3.  Requiring Diversity Disclosure:  The Final Rule 
 On December 16, 2009, the SEC amended Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of 
Regulation S-K96 to require disclosure of 
whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or the 
board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for 
director.  If the nominating committee (or the board) has a 
policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in 
identifying director-nominees, describe how this policy is 
                                                                                                                  
 92  Comment Letter from Hye-Won Choi, Senior Vice President and Head of Corporate Governance, 
TIAA-CREF, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-32.pdf; see also Coll. Ret. Equity Fund, Proxy 
Statement 24, 25 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 9, 2010) (“Although CREF does not have a formal policy 
regarding diversity, in preparing a slate of Trustee candidates, the Nominating and Governance 
Committee seeks to ensure a broad, diverse representation of academic, business and professional 
experience and gender, race and age.”). 
 93  Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229). 
 94  See id. (noting that the commenters cited “meaningful relationship between diverse boards and 
improved corporate financial performance, and that diverse boards can help companies more effectively 
recruit talent and retain staff”). 
 95  Id. (“Consequently, we are adopting amendments to Item 407(c) of Regulation S-K to require 
disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating committee considers diversity in identifying nominees 
for director.”). 
 96  17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2011).  Regulation S-K contains the SEC’s disclosure guidelines 
that explain in detail what needs to be disclosed in the various SEC Forms and Schedules that set forth 
the line-item disclosure requirements. See also 2 HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 33, § 9.4 
(generally discussing Regulation S-K). 
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implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or 
the board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.97 
 Prior to this amendment, the SEC only required “disclosure of any 
specific minimum qualifications that a nominating committee believes must 
be met by a nominee for a position on the board.”98  The amendment 
became effective as of February 28, 2010.99  The impact of the new 
disclosure requirement is discussed in Part IV below. 
a.  No Definition of Diversity 
 The SEC explicitly refused to define diversity.100  Rather, the 
amendment left the definition of diversity open for companies to 
individually define.101  The Commission recognized that a company might 
conceptualize diversity in different ways and place varying emphasis on 
certain traits it considered diverse.102  Although not defining diversity for the 
purpose of the enhanced disclosure requirements, the SEC Commission 
identified traits that might constitute diversity: different viewpoints, 
professional experience, education, skill, race, gender, national origin, and 
other individual qualities that contribute to board heterogeneity.103  The 
Commission further noted that leaving companies to define diversity for 
themselves seemed appropriate in light of the purpose behind the 
amendment.104 
 Some observers have criticized the SEC’s failure to define 
diversity.105  We believe, however, that providing companies the opportunity 
to craft their own definition gives investors additional insights as to what the 
company deems important with respect to diversity on the board.106  In a 
                                                                                                                  
 97  17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi).  
 98  See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076, 35,084 (July 17, 2009) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229) (discussing disclosure requirements that did not include diversity, as Item 407(c)(2)(v) of 
Regulation S-K currently requires). 
 99  Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
229). 
 100  Id. at 68,344 (“[W]e have not defined diversity in the amendments.”). 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. (“We recognize that companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting different 
perspectives.”). 
 103  Id. (“[S]ome companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to include differences of 
viewpoint, professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that 
contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity concepts such as race, gender and 
national origin.”). 
 104  Id. (“We believe that for purposes of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to 
define diversity in ways that they consider appropriate.”). 
 105  See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 855, 874 (2011) (identifying the absence of a definition as “perhaps most devastating to the rule’s 
potential effectiveness”). 
 106  See Thomas Lee Hazen, Diversity on Corporate Boards: Limits of the Business Case and the 
Connection Between Supporting Rationales and the Appropriate Response of the Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
887, 896–97 (2011). 
Reasonable people can differ as to what type of diversity is beneficial to corporate 
governance.  Limiting the concept of diversity would seem to be at odds with the 
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later section, we discuss the various approaches companies have taken in 
response to the enhanced disclosure requirement.107 
b.  Diversity Policy is Not Mandated 
 While Regulation S-K, as amended, requires disclosure of whether 
(and, if so, how) diversity is considered in identifying director-nominees, it 
does not require the nominating committee to consider diversity.108  
Regulation S-K, as amended, does not require the nominating committee to 
have a diversity “policy.”109  However, if there is such a policy, the proxy 
must disclose both how the policy is implemented and how the nominating 
committee assesses the effectiveness of the policy.110  Thus, disclosure is 
required only for those companies that choose to consider diversity as a 
factor in their director nomination process.  The disclosure requirement 
could have a salutary impact.  For example, in discussing the potential 
effects of the diversity disclosure rule, the Commission noted that some 
companies might consider it beneficial to adopt a formal diversity policy in 
light of the new disclosure rule.111  This, in turn, might encourage boards to 
consider a wider range of potential candidates and cause changes in board 
composition.112  As discussed below, the majority of companies appear to 
have included a reference to board diversity in their proxies even if they 
have not formally adopted a diversity policy.113  A review of proxy 
statements before and after the new disclosure requirements reveals that the 
new rule significantly increased the number of companies addressing board 
diversity in some respect in their proxy statement. 
c.  Possible Collateral Impact—Board Diversity and Director 
Independence 
 The SEC observed that requiring diversity disclosure might have 
unintended positive benefits on director independence.114  As previously 
                                                                                                                  
purpose of the rule.  The required disclosures are designed to inform investors as 
to what diversity policies are in place.  A definition of diversity might result in 
unduly limiting what investors can learn from the disclosures. 
Id. at 896. 
 107  See infra Part IV. 
 108  Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229). 
 109  Id. 
 110  See id. at 68,355 (discussing how amendments were not intended to “steer” companies’ behavior 
into adopting diversity policy). 
 111  See id. (“A board may determine, in connection with preparing its disclosure, that it is beneficial 
to disclose and follow a policy of seeking diversity.”). 
 112  See id. (discussing how the new rule may “induce beneficial changes in board composition . . . 
[s]uch a policy may encourage boards to conduct broader director searches, evaluating a wider range of 
candidates and potentially improving board quality”). 
 113  See infra Part IV.B. 
 114  Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,355 (Dec. 23, 2009) (“To the extent 
that boards branch out from the set of candidates they would ordinarily consider, they may nominate 
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discussed, diversity disclosure may encourage boards to consider a wider 
range of candidates in the nomination process, including candidates who 
might be less likely to have ties to the current board.  Finally, the 
Commission noted, an “increase in board independence could potentially 
improve governance [of the company] . . . by encouraging consideration of a 
broader range of views.”115 
4.  SEC Comment Letters on Diversity Disclosure Proxy Language 
 The SEC has issued several comment letters on proxies submitted 
after the effective date of the diversity disclosure rule that have questioned 
the adequacy of a company’s disclosure of its consideration of diversity in 
nominating directors.  For instance, in a letter dated April 7, 2010, to Baxter 
International, Inc., the SEC commented on the company’s proxy filed on 
March 19, 2010: 
We note your disclosure . . . that “[d]iversity of 
background” is a relevant factor in the selection of directors 
process.  In future filings please describe how this policy is 
implemented, as well as how the corporate governance 
committee assesses the effectiveness of its policy as 
requested by Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-K.116 
The company’s response to this comment indicated that it believed 
that it had described how diversity was “considered,” and that because it did 
not view this statement as a diversity “policy,” it was not obligated to then 
also describe how the policy was implemented and assessed. 
The disclosure referred to . . . was intended to address the 
requirements set forth in Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-
K that companies indicate whether, and if so how, diversity 
is considered in identifying directors.  As disclosed, 
Baxter’s Corporate Governance Guidelines provide that 
“[d]iversity of background, including diversity of gender, 
race, ethnic or national origin, age, and experience in 
business, government and education and in healthcare, 
science, technology and other areas relevant to the 
Company’s activities,” is a factor in the director selection 
process.  As a result of this guideline, the Corporate 
Governance Committee may consider diversity of 
background as a relevant factor in the director nomination 
                                                                                                                  
directors who have fewer existing ties to the board or management and are, consequently, more 
independent.”). 
 115  Id. 
 116  Letter from Kate Tillan, Assistant Chief Accountant, SEC, to Robert M. Davis, Chief Financial 
Officer, Baxter International, Inc. (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/10456/000000000010018837/filename1.pdf.  
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process . . . . If such a policy is adopted, we will provide 
disclosure on the existence of the policy as well as how 
such policy is implemented and assessed for effectiveness in 
future filings.  Based on your comment, we will however 
clarify our use of diversity in the director nomination 
process in future filings.117 
 The specific language of Item 407(c)(2)(vi) was being read 
differently, perhaps more loosely, by the SEC staff than by Baxter 
International, as demonstrated by the exchange between the SEC and Baxter 
International above.  Indeed, Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, the SEC 
Commissioner who spearheaded this new rule, in a speech on September 16, 
2010, criticized those companies that “provided only abstract disclosure – 
often times limiting their disclosure to a brief statement indicating diversity 
was something considered as part of an informal policy.”118  Such a 
statement, however, appears to us to meet the requirements of the Item, 
which we read as distinguishing between considering diversity and 
implementing and assessing a diversity policy if one exists.  Commissioner 
Aguilar and the SEC staff seem to be concluding that if a company 
considers diversity as a factor in board nominations, it has a policy with 
respect to diversity, as to which implementation and assessment must be 
discussed.  It is clear that a number of companies, as do we, read the 
language differently.119 
IV.  COMPLIANCE WITH THE DIVERSITY DISCLOSURE RULE 
 We examined the proxy statements of the Fortune 100 companies in 
the year following the effective date of the new diversity policy disclosure 
rule.  We then compared the discussion of the board nomination process 
included in those proxies with the language used by the companies in the 
year preceding the effective date of the rule.120   
 
 
                                                                                                                  
 117  Letter from Robert M. Davis, Chief Financial Officer, Baxter International, Inc., to Kate Tillan, 
Assistant Chief Accountant, SEC (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/10456/ 
000095012310042066/filename1.htm (emphasis added). 
 118  Aguilar, supra note 84, at 2.  Commissioner Aguilar’s description of the rule is that it requires a 
company to disclose “whether diversity is a factor in considering candidates for nomination to the board 
of directors, how diversity is considered in that process, and how the company assesses the effectiveness 
of its policy for considering diversity.” Id. 
 119  See infra note 128. 
 120  See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, Board Diversity Research, UNC SCHOOL OF 
LAW, https://ddi.law.unc.edu/research/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (providing a spreadsheet 
compiling our results). 
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A.  Consideration of Diversity in the Nomination of Directors 
 Ninety of the Fortune 100 companies issued proxies in both of the 
relevant years.121  Two of these ninety companies, Hewlett-Packard 
Company122 and American Express Company,123 did not specifically address 
                                                                                                                  
 121  Four of the Fortune 100 companies are mutual insurance companies owned by policyholders and 
are not publicly traded. State Farm Assoc. Funds Trust, Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 22, 
2005); LIBERTY MUT. INS. GRP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 72 (2011); New York Life Ins. Co., About New 
York Life, N.Y. LIFE INS. CO., available at http://www.newyorklife.com/financialstrength (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2011); Our Company, MASSMUTUAL FIN. GRP., http://www.massmutual.com/aboutmassmutual/ 
ourcompany/mutualstructure (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).  Two additional companies went into government 
conservatorship in September 2008; so, their federal regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, has 
selected and approved the directors. Corporate Governance Under Conservatorship, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/governance/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011); Corporate Governance:  Board of 
Directors, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Jan. 
3, 2011).  One company, Motors Liquidation Company, is the former General Motors Corporation, which 
filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 1, 2009. MOTORS 
LIQUIDATION COMPANIES, http://www.motorsliquidation.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).  The eighth 
company, Enterprise GP Holdings, L.P., merged in 2010 into Enterprise Products Partners, L.P., so there 
was no proxy issued by Enterprise GP Holdings after the effective date of the diversity policy disclosure 
rule. GP Holdings L.P., Current Report 1 (Form 8-K) (Nov. 22, 2010).  The ninth company, CHS Inc., is 
an agricultural cooperative that does not issue proxy statements. See Corporate Governance, CHS INC., 
http://www.chsinc.com/portal/server.pt/community/2corporate_ governance/353 (last visited Jan. 3, 
2011).  Its board members must be members of the cooperative, active farmers or ranchers, and 
representatives of specific regions. Id.  The tenth company, HCA, Inc., went private in 2006. Our 
History, HCA, INC., http://hcahealthcare.com/about/our-history.dot (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
  Although Motors Liquidation Co is not included in this sample because it did not issue proxy 
statements during the two years studied, its predecessor company’s pre-insolvency DEF 14A (Apr. 25, 
2008) and the post-insolvency DEF 14A (Apr. 21, 2011), are virtually identical except that the latter 
version includes several new sentences regarding diversity and defining it broadly to mean a variety of 
opinions, perspectives, personal and professional experiences, and backgrounds, such as gender, race, 
ethnicity, or country of origin. See Gen. Motors Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 25, 
2008); Gen. Motors Co., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 21, 2011).  Further, the proxy states 
that the company believes diversity will “improve the quality of . . . decision making and enhance 
business performance by enabling [the company] to respond more effectively to the needs of customers, 
employees, suppliers, stockholders, and other stakeholders worldwide.” Gen. Motors Co., Proxy 
Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 21, 2011). 
 122  Both Hewlett-Packard Company’s February 1, 2011 and January 27, 2010 proxy statements were 
identical with respect to the criteria for board nominees, stating:  “[M]embers of the Board should have 
the highest professional and personal ethics and values, consistent with longstanding HP values and 
standards.  They should have broad experience at the policy-making level in business, government, 
education, technology or public service.” Compare Hewlett-Packard Co., Proxy Statement 18 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Feb. 1, 2011), with Hewlett-Packard Co., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 27, 
2010) (issued after the final rule was published but before its February 28, 2010 effective date). 
 123  The language in the American Express Company’s March 16, 2010 proxy and in its March 16, 
2009 proxy was identical with respect to the minimum qualifications for director-nominees: 
The minimum characteristics that the Nominating Committee believes must be met 
for a candidate to be nominated include integrity, independence, energy, 
forthrightness, strong analytical skills and the willingness to devote appropriate 
time and attention to the Company’s affairs.  Candidates should also demonstrate a 
willingness to work as part of a team in an atmosphere of trust and a commitment 
to represent the interests of all shareholders rather than those of a specific 
constituency.  Candidates are assessed based on their history of achievement, 
background, specific skills, expertise or experience, personal attributes and 
professional dealings. 
Am. Express Co., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); Am. Express Co., Proxy 
Statement 8–9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 13, 2009).  The 2011 proxy, however, added the following 
sentence:  “The Nominating Committee considers diversity, including gender and racial diversity, in its 
recruitment of directors and considers that the current Board reflects diversity of skills, backgrounds, and 
experiences.” Am. Express Co., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2011). 
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whether diversity is considered in identifying director-nominees.  One could 
argue that by omitting any reference to diversity as a consideration, the 
companies do not specifically consider diversity in their director nomination 
process, and additionally that they do not have a specific diversity policy.  
Absent this construction of the proxies, it would seem that failure to address 
diversity violates the amended Regulation S-K.  One company, Berkshire 
Hathaway, Incorporated, complied with the new requirement by stating that 
it does not have a policy regarding consideration of diversity in nominating 
directors, and, further, that it “does not seek diversity, however defined,” 
thereby explaining how the company “considers” diversity in the 
nomination process.124  This leaves eighty-eight of ninety companies125 that 
                                                                                                                  
 124  The proxy issued after the effective date of the Regulation S-K Amendments specifically added 
to its prior year’s language regarding director nomination:  “Berkshire does not have a policy regarding 
the consideration of diversity in identifying nominees for director.  In identifying director-nominees, the 
Governance, Compensation and Nominating Committee does not seek diversity, however defined.” 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010).  The criteria cited for 
director-nominees were “very high integrity, business savvy, an owner-oriented attitude and a deep 
genuine interest in the Company.” Id.  Similar language was included in the 2009 proxy:  “individuals 
who have a meaningful interest in Berkshire stock, are shareholder-oriented and possess business savvy.” 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 13, 2009). 
 125  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010); ExxonMobil Corp., 
Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2010); Chevron Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 15, 2010); Gen. Elec. Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Bank of Am. 
Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); ConocoPhillips, Proxy Statement 13 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); AT&T Inc., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); Ford 
Motor Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy 
Statement 1 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); McKesson Corp., Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 21, 2010); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement 26 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 15, 2010); CVS 
Caremark Corp., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 29, 2010); Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy 
Statement 41–42 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 18, 2010); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 14, 
2010); The Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 27, 2010); The Kroger 
Co., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (May 14, 2010); AmerisourceBergen Corp., Proxy Statement 
18 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 14, 2011); Costco Wholesale Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 
13, 2010); Valero Energy Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010); The Boeing Co., Proxy Statement 3 
(Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); The Home Depot, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 
2010); Target Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 29, 2010); WellPoint, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 10–11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); Walgreen Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Nov. 22, 2010); Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Medco 
Health Solutions, Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Microsoft Corp., Proxy 
Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 30, 2010); United Tech. Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 
14A) (Feb. 25. 2011); Dell Inc., Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (May 27, 2010); The Goldman 
Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2010); Pfizer Inc., Proxy Statement 6, 12–
13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2010); Marathon Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 
8, 2010); Lowe’s Cos. Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); Lockheed Martin Corp., Proxy Statement 11 
(Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); Best Buy Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (May 11, 2010); 
The Dow Chem. Co., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Supervalu Inc., Proxy 
Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (May 12, 2010); Sears Holdings Corp., Proxy Statement 9–10 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 6, 2010); Int’l Assets Holding Corp., Proxy Statement 13–14 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 14, 
2011); PepsiCo, Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2010); MetLife, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2010); Safeway Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 1, 2010); Kraft Foods Inc., Proxy Statement 1–2 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 30, 2010); Sysco Corp., 
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at least considered diversity in their proxies after the effective date of the 
rule, compared to sixty-two companies126 that discussed diversity in the 
                                                                                                                  
Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2010); Apple Inc., Proxy Statement 10–11 (Form DEF 
14A) (Jan. 7, 2011); The Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 28, 2011); Cisco 
Sys., Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 21, 2010); Comcast Corp., Proxy Statement 15 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); FedEx Corp., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 16, 2010); 
Northrop Grumman Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); Intel Corp., Proxy 
Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 
2010); Prudential Fin., Inc., Proxy Statement 4, 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); Caterpillar Inc., 
Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010); Sprint Nextel Corp., Proxy Statement 11 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 29, 2010); The Allstate Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); Morgan Stanley, Proxy 
Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); The Coca-Cola Co., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 5, 2010); Humana Inc., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Honeywell Int’l Inc., 
Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); Abbott Labs., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); News Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 30, 2010); Sunoco, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Hess Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 25, 2010); Ingram Micro Inc., Proxy Statement 16–17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2010); Time 
Warner Inc., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 5, 2010); Johnson Controls, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 10, 2010); Delta Air Lines, Inc. Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 
14A) (May 17, 2010); Merck & Co., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours and Co., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); Tyson Foods, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 17, 2010); Rite Aid Corp., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) 
(May 21, 2010); Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, Proxy Statement 24–25 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 9, 2010); Philip 
Morris Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Raytheon Co., Proxy Statement 6 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 26, 2010); Express Scripts, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 24, 
2010); The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); The 
Travelers Cos., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Publix Super Mkts., Inc., Proxy 
Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 1, 2010); Amazon.com, Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 14, 2010). 
 126  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement 7, 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2009); ExxonMobil 
Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2009); Chevron Corp., Proxy Statement 19 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2009); Gen. Elec. Co., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 3, 2009); 
ConocoPhillips, Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2009); Ford Motor Co., Proxy 
Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 3, 2009); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 31, 2009); Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement A-1 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 20, 2009); Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Proxy 
Statement A-2 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 5, 2009); Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 
14A) (Sept. 23, 2009); CVS Caremark Corp., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 25, 2009); Int’l 
Bus. Machs. Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2009); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy 
Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 23, 2009); The Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 13 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Aug. 28, 2009); AmerisourceBergen Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 22, 
2010); Costco Wholesale Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 18, 2009); Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 25, 2009); The Boeing Co., Proxy Statement 
14 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 13, 2009); WellPoint, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 3, 
2009); Walgreen Co., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Nov. 24, 2009); Johnson & Johnson, Proxy 
Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2009); Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Proxy Statement 14 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2009); Microsoft Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2009); 
United Techs. Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Feb. 26, 2010); Dell Inc., Proxy Statement 
40 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 1, 2009); The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 6, 2009); Pfizer Inc., Proxy Statement 5, 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2009); Marathon Oil Corp., 
Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2009); United Parcel Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement 9 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2009); Lockheed Martin Corp., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 13, 
2009); Sears Holdings Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2009); Int’l Assets Holding 
Corp., Proxy Statement 10–11 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 15, 2010); PepsiCo, Inc., Proxy Statement 18 
(Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 24, 2009); Kraft Foods Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 
2009); Sysco Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Oct. 8, 2009); Apple Inc., Proxy Statement 10 
(Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 12, 2010); The Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 22, 
2010); Cisco Sys., Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 17, 2009); Comcast Corp., Proxy 
Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 3, 2009); Intel Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 3, 
2009); Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2009); Prudential Fin., Inc., Proxy 
2011] BOARD DIVERSITY AND PROXY DISCLOSURE 63 
context of director nominations in the year preceding the rule’s effective 
date.127 
B.  Board Policy on Diversity in Director Nominations 
Although all but two of the ninety proxy-filing companies discussed 
how they “considered” diversity in director nominations after the rule’s 
effective date, only ten arguably had a formal diversity policy.128  In some 
instances, the proxy identified a diversity “policy,” and in others, the 
proxy’s reference to the company’s corporate governance guidelines or 
principles seemed to provide the basis for the policy.  For example, 
WellPoint, Incorporated’s (“Wellpoint”) 2010 proxy provides: 
Our Corporate Governance Guidelines provide that our 
Governance Committee is to take into account the overall 
diversity of the Board when identifying possible nominees 
for director.  The Committee implements that policy, and 
assesses its effectiveness, by examining the diversity of all 
the directors on the Board when it selects nominees for 
directors.  The diversity of directors is one of the factors 
that the Governance Committee considers, along with the 
                                                                                                                  
Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 20, 2009); Sprint Nextel Corp., Proxy Statement 24 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 30, 2009); Humana Inc., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 10, 2009); Honeywell 
Int’l, Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2009); News Corp., Proxy Statement 10 
(Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 20, 2009); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2009); 
Hess Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 26, 2009); Ingram Micro Inc., Proxy Statement 
12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 21, 2009); Time Warner Inc., Proxy Statement 11–12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 
8, 2009); Johnson Controls, Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 4, 2009); Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 30, 2009); Merck & Co./Schering-Plough Corp., Proxy 
Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 24, 2009); E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Proxy Statement 4 
(Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 20, 2009); Rite Aid Corp., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (May 14, 
2009); Philip Morris Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 26, 2009); Raytheon Co., 
Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 24, 2009); Express Scripts, Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 16, 2009); The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 13, 2009); The Travelers Cos., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2009); 
Amazon.com, Inc., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 17, 2009). 
 127  The number of companies that discussed their consideration of diversity before the rule’s 
effective date could reflect companies that issued proxies after the final rule was published on December 
16, 2009, but before its effective date, or companies that issued proxies after the proposed rule was 
issued on July 10, 2009. 
 128  See supra note 125 (listing all the companies that did consider diversity).  The companies that 
arguably had a formal diversity policy after February 28, 2010, were The Procter & Gamble Company, 
Costco Wholesale Corporation, The Boeing Company, WellPoint, Incorporated, The Goldman Sachs 
Group, Incorporated, Marathon Oil Corporation, Best Buy Company, Sysco Corporation, Hess 
Corporation, and Delta Air Lines, Incorporated.  The Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 6 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Aug. 27, 2010); Costco Wholesale Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 13, 
2010); The Boeing Co., Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 18, 2010); WellPoint, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Marathon Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); 
Best Buy Co., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (May 26, 2010); Sysco Corp., Proxy Statement 6 
(Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2010); Hess Corp., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 25, 2010); 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (May 17, 2010). 
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other selection criteria described above.129 
 Thus, WellPoint “considers” diversity as one of the selection criteria 
and also has a “policy” regarding diversity.  WellPoint disclosed how the 
policy was implemented and assessed when it stated that director diversity is 
examined when the nominees for directors are selected.  But there is no way 
to discern from this disclosure the result of that assessment.  That is, does 
the WellPoint board believe it fulfilled its diversity policy?  The language 
used in the proxy may be sufficient to satisfy the SEC’s requirements, but 
failure to require disclosure of the assessment of the diversity policy’s 
success may demonstrate a shortcoming of the rule as it is currently 
constructed. 
 In some of the other ten instances in which we identified a diversity 
“policy,” however, the language is less clear.130  Marathon Oil Corporation 
(“Marathon Oil”) stated in its 2010 proxy: 
The Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee is 
responsible for reviewing with the Board the appropriate 
skills and characteristics required of board members in the 
context of the current make-up of the Board.  When we 
have an opening on the Board, we will always look at a 
diverse pool of candidates.  In accordance with our 
Corporate Governance Principles, the assessment of the 
Board’s characteristics includes diversity, skills, such as an 
understanding of financial statements and financial 
reporting systems, manufacturing processes, technology and 
international experience.  We view and define diversity in 
its broadest sense, which includes gender, ethnicity, 
education, experience and leadership qualities.131 
 It is clear that Marathon Oil “considers” diversity in identifying 
director-nominees.  It is less clear whether, by reference to its “Corporate 
Governance Principles,” Marathon Oil has implicated a specific diversity 
“policy.”  If so, has it sufficiently articulated how the policy should be 
implemented?  Perhaps it has, by reference to its statement that when there 
are board openings it will always look at a diverse pool of candidates.  
Moreover, if this is a diversity “policy,” has it detailed how it assesses the 
effectiveness of this policy?  The proxy statement uses the word 
“assessment” in reference to the board’s characteristics, including diversity, 
but without disclosure of the result of that assessment, we are left empty-
handed. 
                                                                                                                  
 129  WellPoint, Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2010) (emphasis added). 
 130  See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 131  Marathon Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010) (emphasis added). 
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C.  Specific Board Demographic Information 
 Three of the ten companies that may have diversity “policies” 
provided more specific information about their board demographics to assist 
shareholders in forming their own judgments about the effectiveness of the 
board’s diversity policy.132  The Procter & Gamble Company, Costco 
Wholesale Corporation, and Sysco Corporation each reported the number of 
female and ethnically-diverse members on their boards.133  Three other 
companies also volunteered specific information about the demographic 
composition of their boards.134  This information permits investors to judge 
for themselves how successful the company has been in considering 
diversity.  Indeed, we wrote a comment letter to the SEC on the proposed 
rule urging it to require disclosure of each board’s demographic 
characteristics, along with other background information mandated for each 
director-nominee.135 
D.  Disavowal of Diversity Policy 
 Twenty-eight companies specifically stated that they did not have a 
formal diversity policy even though they may have “considered” diversity in 
selecting director-nominees.136  These companies may have elected not to 
                                                                                                                  
 132  See supra note 128 (lists companies that arguably have a diversity policy); infra notes 134, 135 
(listing companies that provided specific information about their board demographics). 
 133  The Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 27, 2010) (“Three [board 
members] are women; two are African-American; one is Mexican; and one is Indian.”); Costco 
Wholesale Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 13, 2010) (“Currently, of the fourteen 
directors on the Board, two are women and one is African American.”); Sysco Corp., Proxy Statement 6 
(Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2010) (“Because we value gender and racial diversity among our Board 
members, four of our current Board members are women, including one African American, the Chairman 
of the Board is Hispanic and two of current Board members are from outside the United States.”). 
 134  JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement 1 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010) (“Of the 11 
director-nominees, two are women and one is African-American.”); FedEx Corp., Proxy Statement 22 
(DEF 14A) (Aug. 16, 2010) (“The Board is committed to diversity and inclusion and is always looking 
for highly qualified candidates, including women (such as Dr. Jackson and Ambassador Schwab) and 
minorities (such as Dr. Jackson and Mr. J. Smith), who meet our criteria.”); Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement 
18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010) (“We also currently have four women Directors and three African 
American Directors.”). 
 135  Letter from Lissa Lamkin Broome & Thomas Lee Hazen, supra note 78.  However, as discussed, 
the SEC requirements do not go this far. 
 136  ConocoPhillips, Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); AT&T Inc., Proxy 
Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); McKesson Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (June 21, 2010); Am. Int’l 
Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); CVS Caremark Corp., Proxy Statement 
5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 29 2010); Wells Fargo & Co./MN, Proxy Statement 41–42 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 18, 2011); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 14, 2010); 
AmerisourceBergen Corp., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 14, 2011); Medco Health 
Solutions, Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Sears Holding Corp., Proxy 
Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 6, 2010); PepsiCo, Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 23, 2010); Kraft Foods Inc., Proxy Statement 1 (Form DEF 14A)  (Mar. 30, 2010); Northrop 
Grumman Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2011); Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement 18 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Prudential Fin., Inc., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 
2010); Caterpillar Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010); Morgan Stanley, Proxy 
Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); The Coca-Cola Co., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 5, 2010); Humana Inc., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Honeywell Int’l Inc., 
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adopt a policy (as well as to affirmatively disavow the existence of one even 
though they “consider” diversity) because of the Regulation’s extra 
requirements that the proxy discussion disclose how the diversity policy is 
implemented and how the company assesses the effectiveness of the 
diversity policy.  The remaining companies did not affirmatively disavow a 
policy and did not specifically state that they had a policy or guidelines 
relating to diversity.137  Fifty out of the eighty-eight companies that 
considered diversity fell into this category.138  
 
                                                                                                                  
Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); News Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 
14A) (Aug. 30, 2010); Time Warner Inc., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 5, 2010); Merck & 
Co., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); Tyson Foods, Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 
14A) (Dec. 17, 2010); Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, Proxy Statement 24, 25 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 9, 2010); 
The Travelers Cos., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010). 
 137  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010); ExxonMobil Corp., 
Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2010); Chevron Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 15, 2010); Gen. Elec. Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Bank of Am. 
Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Ford Motor Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement 1 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); 
Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); Verizon Commc’ns Inc., Proxy 
Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement 26 (Form DEF 
14A) (Sept. 15, 2010); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); The 
Kroger Co., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (May 14, 2010); Valero Energy Corp., Proxy 
Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010); The Home Depot, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2010); 
Target Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 29, 2010); Walgreen Co., Proxy Statement 16 
(Form DEF 14A) (Nov. 22, 2010); Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 
2010); Microsoft Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 30, 2010); United Techs. Corp., 
Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Feb. 25, 2011); Dell Inc., Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) 
(May 27, 2010); Pfizer Inc., Proxy Statement 6, 12–13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2010); Lowe’s Cos. 
Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); United Parcel Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement 
11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); Lockheed Martin Corp., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 12, 2010); The Dow Chem. Co., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Supervalu 
Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (May 12, 2010); Int’l Assets Holding Corp., Proxy Statement 
13–14 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 14, 2011); MetLife, Inc., Proxy Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 
2010); Safeway Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Apple Inc., Proxy Statement 
10–11 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 7, 2011); The Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 
28, 2011); Cisco Sys., Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 21, 2010); Comcast Corp., 
Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); FedEx Corp., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Aug. 16, 2010); Intel Corp., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); Sprint Nextel Corp., 
Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 29, 2010); The Allstate Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Gen. Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); 
Abbott Labs., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 3 
(Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Ingram Micro Inc., Proxy Statement 16–17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 
20, 2010); Johnson Controls, Inc., Proxy Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 10, 2010); Rite Aid Corp., 
Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (May 21, 2010); Philip Morris Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement 10 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Raytheon Co., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 26, 2010); 
Express Scripts, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 24, 2010); The Hartford Fin. Servs. 
Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); Publix Super Mkts., Inc., Proxy 
Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 1, 2010); Amazon.com, Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 14, 2010).  
 138  See supra note 137. 
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E.  Definition of Diversity 
 As previously noted, the SEC did not define diversity.139  Ten 
companies discussed diversity without providing a definition of it, including 
Berkshire Hathaway, Incorporated, which stated that “however defined” 
diversity was not considered.140  Companies that defined diversity generally 
defined it in one of three ways:  demographics such as gender, race, or 
ethnicity; general factors such as viewpoints or perspectives; or both gender 
and general diversity characteristics.  By our count, thirty-nine of the ninety 
proxy-submitting companies described diversity with reference to 
demographic factors and other more general diversity factors such as 
experience, viewpoints, and perspective.141  Thirty-three companies referred 
only to these general diversity factors.142  Six companies referred only to 
                                                                                                                  
 139  See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
 140  These companies are: ConocoPhillips, Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); 
AT&T Inc., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); Ford Motor Co., Proxy Statement 5 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 
12, 2010); Sears Holdings Corp., Proxy Statement 9–10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 6, 2010); PepsiCo, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2010); Prudential Fin., Inc., Proxy Statement 9 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); Johnson Controls, Inc., Proxy Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 10, 
2010); Express Scripts, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 24, 2010). 
 141  ExxonMobil Corp., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2010); Chevron Corp., Proxy 
Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 15, 2010); Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 17, 2010); Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); McKesson Corp., 
Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 21, 2010); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement 26 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 15, 2010); 
CVS Caremark Corp., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 29, 2010); The Procter & Gamble Co., 
Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 27, 2010); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Proxy Statement 5 
(Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010); The Boeing Co., Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 
2010); Walgreen Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Nov. 22, 2010); Johnson & Johnson, Proxy 
Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Microsoft Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 30, 2010); The 
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2010); Pfizer Inc., Proxy 
Statement 6, 12–13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2010); Marathon Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); United Parcel Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 
2010); Best Buy Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (May 11, 2010); Supervalu Inc., Proxy 
Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (May 12, 2010); Sysco Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 
29, 2010); Comcast Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); FedEx Corp., Proxy 
Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 16, 2010); Northrop Grumman Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); Intel Corp., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); Aetna Inc., 
Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Morgan Stanley, Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); The Coca-Cola Co., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 5, 2010); 
Humana Inc., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Honeywell Int’l Inc., Proxy 
Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); Abbott Labs., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 15, 2010); News Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 30, 2010); Sunoco, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Merck & Co., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, Proxy Statement 24–25 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 9, 2010); 
Philip Morris Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); The Hartford Fin. Servs. 
Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); The Travelers Cos., Proxy Statement 18 
(Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010). 
 142  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010); Gen. Elec. Co., 
Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Verizon Commc’ns Inc., Proxy Statement 10 
(Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement 41–42 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 
18, 2010); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); 
AmerisourceBergen Corp., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 14, 2011); Costco Wholesale 
Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 13, 2010); Target Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 29, 2010); WellPoint, Inc., Proxy Statement 10–11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); 
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demographic diversity factors143 including gender and race by two 
companies;144 gender, race, and ethnicity by three companies;145 and gender, 
race, and national origin by one company.146  Some companies also 
discussed national origin as a diversity factor.  The general diversity 
definitions included a broad range of factors.  For instance, the following 
phrases were included in at least one of the proxy statements examined: 
viewpoints, experiences, skills, talent, background, international 
background, cultural background, education, age, geographic origin, and 
leadership qualities.147 
 It is clear, however, that many more companies talked about 
diversity after the effective date of the amended Regulation S-K than in the 
preceding year.  By our count, while sixty-two of the ninety Fortune 100 
companies filing proxies mentioned diversity in connection with board 
nominations in the proxy year immediately preceding the effective date of 
Revised Regulation S-K, eighty-six companies (twenty-four more) added 
diversity as at least a consideration in the proxy year following the 
                                                                                                                  
United Techs. Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Feb. 25, 2011); Dell Inc., Proxy Statement 3 
(Form DEF 14A) (May, 27, 2010); Lowe’s Cos. Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 
2010); Lockheed Martin Corp., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); The Dow Chem. 
Co., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); MetLife, Inc., Proxy Statement 19 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2010); Safeway Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Kraft 
Foods Inc., Proxy Statement 1–2 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 30, 2010); The Walt Disney Co., Proxy 
Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 28, 2011); Cisco Sys., Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Sept. 21, 2010); Caterpillar Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010); Sprint Nextel 
Corp., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 29, 2010); The Allstate Corp., Proxy Statement 9 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Gen. Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 
2010); Hess Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 25, 2010); Ingram Micro Inc., Proxy 
Statement 16–17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2010); Time Warner Inc., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 5, 2010); Delta Air Lines, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (May 17, 2010); E. I du 
Pont de Nemours and Co., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); Tyson Foods, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 17, 2010); Rite Aid Corp., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 
14A) (May 21, 2010); Raytheon Co., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 26, 2010); Publix Super 
Mkts., Inc., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 1, 2010); Amazon.com, Inc., Proxy Statement 7 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 14, 2010). 
 143  In total, seventy-eight companies provided definitions of diversity, ten did not define diversity, 
and the remaining two reporting companies did not address diversity at all in their description of the 
director nomination process. 
 144  UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy Statement 21 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2011); Apple Inc., Proxy 
Statement 10–11 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 7, 2011). 
 145  JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement 1 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); The Kroger Co., 
Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (May 14, 2010); The Home Depot, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2010). 
 146  Valero Energy Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010). 
 147  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010) (viewpoints and 
experiences); McKesson Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 21, 2010) (skills); Gen. Elec. 
Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010) (age, background, and experience); Wells 
Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement 41–42 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 18, 2010) (education); The Procter & 
Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 27, 2010) (gender and international 
background); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010) 
(geographic origin); Marathon Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010) 
(leadership qualities); Sysco Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2010) (cultural 
background). 
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amendments.148  The revised disclosure rule has resulted in additional 
consideration of diversity, and in all cases but one,149 a positive 
consideration of diversity as a factor in selecting board nominees.  
Moreover, although there was no SEC-provided definition of diversity, 
many more companies referenced one or more of the demographic diversity 
factors, gender, race, and ethnicity, than referenced in the past.  Only nine 
companies referenced gender as a factor in director selection in the proxy 
year preceding the amendments to the rule, while forty-one referenced 
gender in the proxy year following the rule, a 356% increase.150  Only two 
                                                                                                                  
 148  These companies included: Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 
2010); AT&T Inc., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 10, 2011); McKesson Corp., Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 21, 2010); Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement 41 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 18, 2010); The Kroger Co., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (May 14, 2010); Valero 
Energy Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); The Home Depot, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2010); Target Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 
29, 2010); Lowe’s Cos. Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Best Buy Co., Proxy 
Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (May 11, 2010); The Dow Chem. Co., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Supervalu Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (May 12, 2010); MetLife, 
Inc., Proxy Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2010); Safeway Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); FedEx Corp., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 16, 2010); Northrop 
Grumman Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); Caterpillar Inc., Proxy Statement 
12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 19, 2010); Gen. Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 
19, 2010); Morgan Stanley, Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); The Coca-Cola Co., 
Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 5, 2010); Abbott Labs., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 15, 2010); Tyson Foods, Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 17, 2010); Coll. Ret. 
Equities Fund, Proxy Statement 24 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 9, 2010); Publix Super Mkts., Inc., Proxy 
Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 1, 2010). 
 149  Berkshire Hathaway “does not seek diversity, however defined.” Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy 
Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010). 
 150  The companies that referenced gender in the proxy year preceding the amendments to the rule 
were: The Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 28, 2009); Johnson & 
Johnson, Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2009); Microsoft Corp., Proxy Statement 5 
(Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2009); Pfizer Inc., Proxy Statement 5, 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2009); 
Apple Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 12, 2010); News Corp., Proxy Statement 10 
(Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 20, 2009); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2009); 
Time Warner Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2009); Merck & Co./Schering-Plough 
Corp., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 24, 2009). 
  The forty-one companies that referenced gender in the year following the rule were: ExxonMobil 
Corp., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2010); Chevron Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 15, 2010); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement 1 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 
2010); Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); McKesson Corp., Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 21, 2010); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement 26 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 15, 2010); CVS 
Caremark Corp., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 29, 2010); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy 
Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 14, 2010); The Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Aug. 27, 2010); The Kroger Co., Proxy Statement Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) 
(May 14, 2010); Valero Energy Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010); The Boeing Co., Proxy 
Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); The Home Depot, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 7, 2010); Walgreen Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Nov. 22, 2010); Johnson & 
Johnson, Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Microsoft Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Sept. 30, 2010); Pfizer Inc., Proxy Statement 6, 12–13 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2010); Marathon Oil 
Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); United Parcel Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement 
11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); Best Buy Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (May 11, 
2010); Supervalu Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (May 12, 2010); Sysco Corp., Proxy 
Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2010); Apple Inc., Proxy Statement 10–11 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Jan. 7, 2011); Comcast Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); FedEx Corp., Proxy 
70 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
 
companies mentioned race in the year preceding the proxy rule amendments, 
while twenty-five companies included race as a factor in the year following 
the rule, an 1150% increase.151  Finally, ethnicity and national origin as 
diversity factors increased from seven instances in the year preceding the 
effective date of the rule to twenty-seven instances in the year following the 
effective date of the rule, a 286% increase.152 
                                                                                                                  
Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 16, 2010); Northrop Grumman Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Apr. 9, 2010); Intel Corp., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); Aetna Inc., 
Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); The Coca-Cola Co., Proxy Statement 14 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 5, 2010); Humana Inc., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); 
Honeywell Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); Abbott Labs., Proxy 
Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); News Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 
30, 2010); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Merck & Co., Proxy 
Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, Proxy Statement 24–25 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Jun. 9, 2010); The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 8, 2010); The Travelers Cos., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010). 
 151  The two companies that mentioned race in the year preceding the rule were: The Procter & 
Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 28, 2009); Merck & Co./Schering-Plough 
Corp., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 24, 2009). 
  The twenty-five companies that mentioned race after the rule were: Chevron Corp., Proxy 
Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 15, 2010); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement 1 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar 12, 2010); McKesson 
Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 21, 2010); Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement 26 
(Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 15, 2010); CVS Caremark Corp., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 29, 
2010); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 14, 2010); The Procter & 
Gamble Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 27, 2010); The Kroger Co., Proxy Statement 15 
(Form DEF 14A) (May 14, 2010); Valero Energy Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 
2010); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010); The Boeing 
Co., Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); The Home Depot, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2010); Walgreen Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Nov. 22, 2010); 
Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); Sysco Corp., Proxy Statement 6 
(Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2010); Northrop Grumman Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 9, 2010); Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); The Coca-Cola Co., 
Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 5, 2010); Humana Inc., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Merck & Co., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); Coll. Ret. 
Equities Fund, Proxy Statement 24 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 9, 2010); The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 
Proxy Statement 23 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); The Travelers Cos., Proxy Statement 18 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010). 
 152  Companies which included ethnicity in the year preceding the rule were:  Johnson & Johnson, 
Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Microsoft Corp., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 
14A) (Sept. 29, 2009); Pfizer Inc., Proxy Statement 5, 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2009); News Corp., 
Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Aug. 20, 2009); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 17, 2009); Time Warner Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2009); Merck & 
Co./Schering-Plough Corp., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 24, 2009).  
  Companies which included ethnicity in the year after the rule were:  ExxonMobil Corp., Proxy 
Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2010); Chevron Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 15, 2010); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement 1 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Citigroup 
Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); McKesson Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Jun. 21, 2010); The Kroger Co., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (May 14, 2010); 
Valero Energy Corp., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); The Boeing Co., Proxy 
Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); The Home Depot, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 7, 2010); Walgreen Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Nov. 22, 2010); Johnson & 
Johnson, Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Microsoft Corp., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Sept. 30, 2010); Pfizer Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2010); Marathon Oil Corp., 
Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); Best Buy Co., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 
14A) (May 11, 2010); Supervalu Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (May 12, 1010); Sysco Corp., 
Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 29, 2010); Intel Corp., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) 
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F.  Proxies of Smaller Companies 
 We also looked at the proxies of smaller companies during the same 
time period—the proxy year preceding the new rule’s February 28, 2010 
effective date and the proxy year following that date—to see if there were 
similar patterns in response to the rule.  For this sample, we chose the fifty 
largest companies headquartered in North Carolina, as reported in Business 
North Carolina in 2010.153  Only two of these companies, Bank of America 
Corporation and Lowe’s Companies, Incorporated, were also in the 
previously described sample of Fortune 100 companies.154  Three of the fifty 
North Carolina companies did not mention diversity as a consideration in 
selecting director-nominees.155  The other forty-seven companies did list 
diversity as a factor,156 compared to only twenty-two companies listing this 
in the proxy year preceding the February 28, 2010 effective date.157  Only 
one company arguably had a formal diversity policy158 and twenty-four 
companies specifically stated that they did not have a formal diversity 
                                                                                                                  
(Apr. 2, 2010); Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); The Coca-Cola Co., 
Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 5, 2010); Humana Inc., Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 9, 2010); Honeywell Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2010); Abbott 
Labs., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 15, 2010); News Corp., Proxy Statement 15 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Aug. 30, 2010); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); Merck & 
Co., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010). 
 153  Frank Maley, Top 75 Public Companies, BUSINESS N.C., AUG. 2010, at 33. 
 154  See Fortune 500: Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, May 3, 2010, at F-1, F-3. 
 155  Carlisle Cos. Inc., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 18, 2010); Ingles Mkts. Inc., 
Proxy Statement 5, 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 21, 2010); Sealy Corp., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 5, 2010). 
 156  See infra notes 161–164. 
 157  Reynolds Am., Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2009); Salix Pharm., Ltd., 
Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 30, 2009); Hanesbrands, Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 12, 2009); Polymer Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 23, 2010); Tekelec, 
Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 15, 2009); Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., Proxy Statement 
A-1 (Form DEF 12A) (Apr. 21, 2009); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 24, 2009); Nucor Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 25, 2009); First Bancorp, 
Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2009); POZEN Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 22, 2009); Tanger Factory Outlet Ctrs., Inc., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 27, 2009); 
Highwoods Props., Inc., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 2, 2009); Cree, Inc., Proxy Statement 
52 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 4, 2009); Lorillard, Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 
2009); Lance, Inc., Proxy Statement 7–8 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 26, 2010); RF Micro Devices, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 18, 2009); The Pantry, Inc., Proxy Statement 6 (Form DEF 
14A) (Jan. 22, 2010); Insteel Indus., Inc., Proxy Statement 9 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 5, 2010); Pike Elec. 
Corp., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Oct. 22, 2009); Polypore Int’l, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 
(Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2009); The Cato Corp., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2009); 
Speedway Motorsports, Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 25, 2009). 
 158  Tekelec was the company that came closest to having a formal diversity policy, although the 
language in its proxy could be interpreted as only a factor.  The Tekelec proxy did state that the diversity 
of the board is evaluated each year. Tekelec, Proxy Statement 10–11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 7, 2010). 
Pursuant to its charter, the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee 
considers the diversity of backgrounds, experience and competencies of director-
nominees as they relate to existing representation on the Board.  The current 
members of the Board have diverse educational backgrounds and career 
experiences and represent different genders and geographies.  The Board evaluates 
the diversity of the Board during the annual self-assessment process. 
Id. 
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policy.159  Only one company, Reynolds American, Incorporated, reported 
the demographic composition of its board.160  Of the forty-seven companies 
that considered diversity as a factor in director selection, four companies did 
not define diversity,161 only two companies defined diversity exclusively by 
demographic diversity factors,162 twenty-one companies defined diversity by 
general factors (e.g., viewpoints, experiences, skills, background, 
education),163 and twenty companies defined diversity by reference to some 
combination of demographic diversity and general diversity.164  Prior to the 
                                                                                                                  
 159  Salix Pharm., Ltd., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 30, 2010); Hanesbrands, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010); Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Proxy Statement 31 
(Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 14, 2011); Red Hat, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 25, 2010); 
Progress Energy, Inc., Proxy Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 15 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 2, 2010); SPX Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 24, 2010); Polymer Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 23, 2010); Martin 
Marietta Materials, Inc., Proxy Statement 20 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 23, 2010); First Bancorp, Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); Ruddick Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Dec. 27, 2010); The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., Proxy Statement 15, 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 
30, 2010); First Citizens BancShares, Inc./DE, Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); 
POZEN Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 27, 2010); Aviat Networks, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 27, 2010); Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 
14A) (Apr. 1, 2010); Lorillad, Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 5, 2010); MedCath 
Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Jun. 27, 2011); Ingles Mkt., Inc., Proxy Statement 5, 7 
(Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 21, 2010); The Pantry, Inc., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 28, 2011); 
Insteel Indus., Inc., Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 30, 2010); Polymore Int’l, Inc., Proxy 
Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2010); Speedway Motorsports, Inc., Proxy Statement 12 (Form 
DEF 14A) (Mar. 25, 2010); Old Dominion Freight Line Inc./VA, Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Apr. 19, 2010). 
 160  Reynolds Am., Inc., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010) (“The Board’s 
diversity also is reflected by the fact that it counts three women, two African Americans and four non-
U.S. citizens among its members.”). 
 161  Salix Pharm. Ltd., Proxy Statement 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 30, 2010); First Bancorp, Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); Ruddick Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Dec. 27, 2010); Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc., Proxy Statements 7 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2010). 
 162  Hanesbrands, Inc., Proxy Statement 10 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 12, 2010) (race, ethnicity and 
gender); Nucor Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 24, 2010) (race and gender). 
 163  Reynolds Am. Inc., Proxy Statement 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); VF Corp., Proxy 
Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 19, 2010); CommScope, Inc., Proxy Statement 4 (Form DEF 14A) 
(Mar. 19, 2010); BB&T Corp., Proxy Statement 23–24 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010); Progress 
Energy, Inc., Proxy Statement 19 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Inspire Pharm., Inc., Proxy 
Statement 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 23, 2010); SPX Corp., Proxy Statement 12 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 
24, 2010); Lowe’s Cos. Inc., Proxy Statement 14 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010); POZEN Inc., Proxy 
Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 27, 2010); Highwoods Prop., Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Form DEF 
14A) (Mar. 31, 2010); Cree, Inc., Proxy Statement 56 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 3, 2010); Lorillard, Inc., 
Proxy Statement 11 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 5, 2010); MedCath Corp., Proxy Statement 13 (Form DEF 
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February 28, 2010 effective date of the revised Regulation S-K, only three 
companies mentioned gender, race, or ethnicity as part of their proxy 
definition of diversity.165  After that date, however, eleven companies listed 
race as part of the definition of diversity,166 eleven companies listed 
ethnicity as a component of diversity,167 and seventeen companies listed 
gender.168 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The amended proxy disclosure rule regarding board diversity is a 
positive step that may increase discussion of diversity issues in board 
nominating committees.  It supplements ongoing efforts by various groups 
focused on increasing board diversity, but it does so in a way that is far less 
intrusive than the quota approach adopted in several other countries.  In 
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Materials, Inc., Proxy Statement A-1 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 21, 2009); Nucor Corp., Proxy Statement 
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several years, it will be interesting to compare board diversity figures with 
the comparable numbers as of the February 28, 2010 effective date of the 
rule to see whether the rule’s adoption correlates with any significant 
increase in board diversity. 
 It is obvious, however, that companies and the SEC are interpreting 
the new rule differently.  The vast majority of companies do not seem to 
equate “consideration” of diversity with having a diversity “policy,” 
although the SEC’s comments on several proxies and Commissioner 
Aguilar’s public statements seem to conflate the two.  Many companies 
have parsed the rule’s language and view consideration of diversity in 
nominating directors as different and distinct from having a formal diversity 
policy.  Many even affirmatively state that they do not have a diversity 
policy, and therefore they do not trigger the rule’s requirements of 
discussing implementation of the policy and how the company assesses the 
effectiveness of the policy. 
 We urge the SEC to issue interpretive guidance on the amended rule 
to explicate that any consideration of diversity in board nominations reflects 
a policy to consider diversity, therefore implementation and assessment of 
that policy must then be discussed.  This would be preferable to the 
piecemeal proxy comment process, which is now the only guidance 
companies are receiving about the SEC’s interpretation of the rule. 
 Any such guidance from the SEC might also suggest other elements 
in the diversity disclosure that might be viewed favorably by the investors 
who commented so enthusiastically on the diversity disclosure aspects of the 
proposed rule amendments.  For instance, in addition to discussing how the 
diversity policy is assessed, investors would benefit from knowing the 
results of the assessment.  Did the company fulfill its diversity policy or is it 
still working toward that goal?  Companies may wish to consider voluntarily 
disclosing the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of their slate of 
director-nominees.  Commissioner Aguilar suggested in a speech that 
companies might wish to discuss “concrete steps taken to develop a slate of 
diverse candidates,” such as interviewing female or minority candidates, 
instructing a search firm to seek women or minority candidates, and 
soliciting recommendations for director-nominees from organizations 
focused on identifying nominees with diverse backgrounds.169 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
 169  Aguilar, supra note 84. 
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DIVERSITY DISCLOSURES IN PROXIES 
 
 Fortune 
100 # 
(90 proxy 
issuers) 
Fortune 
100 % 
NC 50 # NC 50 
% 
Diversity not considered 
as a factor 
2 2.2% 3 6% 
Formal diversity policy 10 11.1% 1 2% 
Stated that no formal 
diversity policy existed 
28 31.1% 24 48% 
Reported board’s 
demographic diversity 
6 6.7% 1 2% 
Diversity definition     
- No definition 10 11.1% 4 8% 
- Demographic only 6 6.7% 2 4% 
- General only 33 36.7% 21 42% 
